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We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model to study the impact of the 2003 dividend and capital
gains tax cuts. In the model, firms are heterogeneous in productivity and make investment and financing
decisions subject to capital adjustment costs, equity issuance costs, and collateral constraints. We show
that when the dividend and capital gains tax cuts are unexpected and permanent, dividend payments,
equity issuance, and aggregate investment rise immediately. By contrast, when these tax cuts are unexpected
and temporary, aggregate investment falls in the short run. This fall allows firms to distribute large
dividends initially in response to the temporary dividend tax cut. We also find that the effects of a
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A large literature in macroeconomics and public ¯nance studies the e®ects of tax reforms on
the economy.1 A central result is that the e®ects can be quite di®erent depending on whether
the tax changes are expected or unexpected, and are temporary or permanent. This result
appears relevant because recent tax reforms often specify phase-ins or sunsets. In this paper,
we focus on the dividend and capital gains tax reform of 2003. The Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) reduced the tax rates on dividends and capital gains and
eliminated the wedge between these two tax rates through 2008. These tax cuts were later
extended through 2010. There is a signi¯cant debate on whether these tax cuts will expire, or
will be extended again.
The objective of this paper is to study the dynamic e®ects of temporary and permanent
changes in dividend and capital gains taxes on the economy in a dynamic general equilibrium
model with ¯rm heterogeneity in productivity. Previous tax analyses typically adopt the neo-
classical growth model framework with a representative ¯rm. In a nonstochastic steady-state,
the representative ¯rm is able to ¯nance its investment using retained earnings, and the divi-
dend taxation is irrelevant. In reality, some young ¯rms may not have enough retained earnings
and need external ¯nancing. Thus, dividend taxation a®ects their investment choices. This
motivates our introduction of ¯rm heterogeneity in the analysis. In our model, ¯rms decide
how much to invest and how to ¯nance investment subject to equity issuance costs, collat-
eral constraints, and capital adjustment costs. When making ¯nancing decisions, ¯rms decide
whether to use internal funds, debt, or external equity. In any period, there is a cross sectional
distribution of ¯rms that have di®erent behaviors. Firms are forward-looking and have perfect
foresight about future course of tax policies.
We focus on the dynamic e®ects of dividend and capital gains tax policies only, holding
other taxes ¯xed. We use our model to provide a quantitative evaluation of the 2003 dividend
and capital gains tax cuts prescribed by the JGTRRA, by numerically solving steady states
and transitional dynamics. According to the JGTRRA, the capital gains tax rate is reduced
from the previous 20 percent level for individuals in the top four tax brackets (facing marginal
1See e.g. Abel (1982), Auerbach (1989), and Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987). Also see Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2007) for a textbook treatement.
1tax rates of 25, 28, 33 and 35 percent) to 15 percent. It is reduced from the previous 10 percent
for individuals in the lower two tax brackets (facing marginal tax rates of 10 and 15 percent) to
5 percent. In addition, dividends are taxed at the same rate as capital gains, while they were
taxed as ordinary income before 2003. In particular, dividends are taxed at the 15 percent rate
for individuals in the top four tax brackets. This tax reform was ¯rst proposed by the Bush
administration in January 2003 and was signed into law in May 2003. The original proposal put
forward by President Bush was eventually dropped and replaced by a simpler version. Whether
or not the ¯nal version would be passed was quite uncertain before May 2003, and thus we
view the 2003 dividend tax cuts as largely unexpected.2
We ¯nd that the economic e®ects of the unexpected dividend and capital gains tax cuts
are quite di®erent, depending on whether these tax cuts are permanent or temporary. When
the tax cuts are permanent, aggregate capital, investment, consumption, output, labor, and
total factor productivity (TFP) all increase in the steady state. In addition, aggregate dividend
payments and equity issuance also increase in the steady state. During the transition phase,
aggregate capital increases monotonically over time. Aggregate investment rises on impact, but
aggregate consumption falls on impact. By contrast, when the dividend and capital gains tax
cuts are unexpected and temporary, as was likely the case in 2003, the steady state does not
change. But aggregate investment decreases and aggregate dividend payments increase, during
the periods when the tax cuts are implemented. In addition, aggregate output rises temporarily
in the short run due to the increase in labor and the positive capital reallocation e®ect, measured
by the temporary increase in TFP. When the tax cuts expire, investment surges and dividend
payments fall. Our calibrated baseline model without debt ¯nancing predicts that the 2003
dividend and capital gains tax cuts may reduce aggregate investment by about 11 percent
relative to the initial steady-state level during the transition phase.
Our analysis is in the spirit of Abel (1982), Auerbach (1989), Auerbach and Hines (1987),
and Auerbach and Kotliko® (1987), who analyze the dynamic e®ects of permanent and tempo-
rary corporate tax changes. Existing literature lacks a similar analysis of dividend tax policy.
Such an analysis is important for understanding the 2003 dividend and capital gains tax cuts.
2House and Shapiro (2006) also argue that the tax cuts were largely unexpected. In particular, these tax cuts
were not part of the 2001 election platform.
2Gourio and Miao (2010), Korinek and Stiglitz (2009), and McGrattan and Prescott (2005)
study related theoretical issues.3 Korinek and Stiglitz (2009) obtain some results qualitatively
similar to ours.4 But they do not provide a quantitative general equilibrium analysis. They
also do not consider capital adjustment costs, debt ¯nancing, and taxes on corporate income
and capital gains, that are important for ¯rms' investment and ¯nancial policies. In addition,
a ¯rm's capital stock is equal to its investment in their model and hence their model cannot
deliver a capital reallocation e®ect of a dividend tax cut.
In a general equilibrium growth model, McGrattan and Prescott (2005) show that perma-
nent changes in the e®ective marginal tax rate on corporate distributions a®ect equity value,
but not the capital-output ratio. As in Bradford (1981), they do not distinguish between
dividends and repurchases by assuming that a °at tax rate is applied to the total corporate
distributions. In this case, the representative ¯rm's objective function is a®ected by a constant
multiplicative factor in the presence of dividend taxation. Their model is consistent with the
\new view" of dividend taxation in the public ¯nance literature (e.g., Auerbach (1979), Brad-
ford (1981), and King (1977)). We show that their result does not hold true when ¯rms are
subject to di®erential dividend and capital gains taxation and when there is ¯rm heterogeneity
in productivity (also see Gourio and Miao (2010)). In particular, we show that a temporary
dividend tax cut and a temporary capital gains tax cut may have opposite e®ects during the
transition phase in our model.
Our model di®ers from the existing literature in two main respects.5 First, most existing
studies analyze a single ¯rm's decision problem in partial equilibrium. These studies ignore
¯rm heterogeneity which may be important for understanding the economic e®ects of dividend
taxation, as emphasized by the theoretical study of Gourio and Miao (2010) and the empirical
study of Auerbach and Hassett (2002). Second, most existing studies focus on the e®ects of
permanent dividend tax changes. However, the 2003 dividend tax cuts may be temporary.
Gourio and Miao (2010) analyze the long-run e®ect of a permanent dividend and capital gains
tax cut. We extend Gourio and Miao (2010) by studying the transitional dynamics for the case
3Sinn (1991) lays out a model of the e®ects of dividend taxation in which ¯rms go through di®erent phases
from immature to mature. But he does not study quantitative e®ects of tax changes.
4In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we will provide more detailed comparisons of our results and theirs.
5See Auerbach (2002), Gordon and Dietz (2006), or Poterba and Summers (1985) for surveys.
3of a permanent or temporary tax cut. We also extend Gourio and Miao (2010) by endogenizing
¯rms' choices between debt ¯nancing and equity ¯nancing.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets up a baseline model without
debt ¯nancing. Section 3 provides quantitative results based on this baseline model. Section 4
extends the baseline model to incorporate debt ¯nancing. Section 5 concludes. Appendices A
and B provide the numerical method for the baseline model.
2 Baseline Model
In order to isolate the e®ect of debt ¯nancing, we start with a baseline model without debt.
The model economy consists of a representative household, a continuum of ¯rms with a unit
mass, and a government. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0;1;2;:::: Assume that there
is no aggregate uncertainty and that ¯rms face idiosyncratic productivity shocks. By a law of
large numbers, all aggregate quantities and prices are deterministic over time, although each
¯rm still is exposed to idiosyncratic uncertainty.
In order to study transitional dynamics in response to dividend and capital gains tax cuts
in a parsimonious and transparent way, we consider a simple tax system in which dividend
tax rate ¿d
t and capital gains tax rate ¿
g
t may change over time, while corporate tax rate ¿c
and labor and interest income tax rate ¿i are constant over time. In addition, we assume that
lump-sum taxes or transfers are available and that capital gains taxes are based on accrual
rather than realization.6
2.1 Firms
Firms are ex ante identical and are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. They di®er ex
post in that they may experience di®erent histories of productivity shocks. Assume that these
shocks are generated by a Markov process with transition function Q:
Firms combine labor and capital to produce output according to the production function
yt = F (kt;lt;zt), where kt, lt; and zt denote capital, labor and productivity, respectively.
Assume that F (¢) is strictly increasing, strictly concave in the ¯rst two arguments, and satis¯es
6In the U.S., capital gains are taxed on realization rather than on accrual. Incorporating a realization-based
capital gains tax would complicate our analysis signi¯cantly.
4the usual Inada conditions. We can then derive the operating pro¯t function ¼ (kt;zt;wt) by
solving the following static labor choice problem:
¼ (kt;zt;wt) = max
lt
fF (kt;lt;zt) ¡ wtltg; (1)
where wt denotes the wage rate. This problem gives the labor demand function l(kt;zt;wt) and
the output supply yt(kt;zt) = F (kt;l(kt;zt;wt);zt):
When a ¯rm makes investment xt to increase its capital stock, its capital stock kt+1 in the
next period satis¯es:
kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)kt + xt; k0 given, (2)
where ± 2 (0;1) denotes the depreciation rate. Investment incurs adjustment costs. For
simplicity, we consider the quadratic adjustment cost function, Ãx2
t=(2kt); widely used in the
empirical investment literature.
Firms use internal or external funds to ¯nance investments. In the baseline model, we
assume that ¯rms can access to external equity markets only. In Section 4, we extend this
model to allow ¯rms to use debt ¯nancing as well. Raising new equity is costly due to informa-
tion asymmetry or transactions costs. Following Chen and Ritter (2000), Gomes (2001) and
Hennessy and Whited (2005), we assume that for each dollar of raised new equity, there is a
°otation cost ¸:
A ¯rm's problem is to choose investment and ¯nancial policies so as to maximize its equity
value. In order to formulate this decision problem, we ¯rst derive a typical ¯rm's equity

























t+1 denotes the required rate of return on equity between period t and period t + 1,
dt+1 is the ¯rm's period t + 1 dividend payments, and st+1 denotes the value of equity newly
issued (repurchases) in period t + 1 if st+1 ¸ (<)0: Note that 1st+1>0 is an indicator function,
taking the value 1 if st+1 > 0; and zero, otherwise. In addition, Et denotes the conditional
7According to the U.S. tax system, capital losses are tax deductible within some limit. For tractability, we
ignore this limit in our model.
5expectation operator with respect to the distribution induced by the idiosyncratic productivity
shocks.
Because we assume there is no aggregate uncertainty, there is no risk premium for equity.












dt ¡ (1 + ¸1st>0)st +
EtVt+1






where we de¯ne the cum-dividend equity value as:







We may solve this equation forward and impose a no bubble condition to obtain equity value


































The ¯rm chooses investment and ¯nancial policies (xt;kt+1;st;dt) to maximize its equity





+ dt = (1 ¡ ¿c)¼ (kt;zt;wt) + ¿c±kt + st; (7)
dt ¸ 0; (8)
st ¸ ¡¹ s; (9)
for all t ¸ 0:
Equation (7) describes the °ow of funds condition for the ¯rm. The source of funds consists
of after-tax pro¯ts and new equity issuance. The use of funds consists of investment expenditure
and dividend payments. Dividend payments cannot be negative. We thus impose constraint
(8). We do not consider other constraints on dividend payments as in Auerbach (2002) and
Poterba and Summers (1983). There may be e®ective restriction on share repurchases. In
6the United States, share repurchases are allowed. However, regular repurchases may lead the
IRS to treat repurchases as dividends. Also, repurchases may be costly. These costs may be
associated with asymmetric information (see, e.g., Brennan and Thakor (1990)). To re°ect the
regulatory constraint, we follow Poterba and Summers (1985) to impose a constraint that share












represents the tax wedge between internal ¯nance and




t+j for all t and j, the Miller and Modigliani dividend policy irrelevance theorem
holds (Miller and Modigliani (1961)). In particular, a ¯rm's investment and payout policies are
independent. In addition, dividend payments and share repurchases (or equity issuance) are




t+j and ¸ > 0, ¯ve cases may happen in the ¯rm's optimization
problem. Each case corresponds to a di®erent ¯nance regime:
1. The equity issuance regime: dt = 0;st > 0: In this regime, the ¯rm does not pay dividends
but issues new equity. This ¯rm has a relatively small capital stock and relatively high
productivity. Hence, it decides to raise new equity to ¯nance investment. This is typically
the case for young and small ¯rms.
2. Internal growth regime: dt = 0; st = 0: In this regime, the ¯rm does not pay dividends.
In addition, it does not buy back shares or issue new equity.
3. The equity buy-back regime: dt = 0; ¡¹ s < st < 0: In this regime, the ¯rm does not pay
dividends, but buys back equity. In addition, the share repurchase constraint (9) does
not bind.
4. The dividend-constrained regime: dt = 0; st = ¡¹ s: In this regime, the ¯rm does not
pay dividends, but buys back equity as much as possible so that the share repurchase
constraint (9) binds.
5. The dividend-paying regime: dt > 0; st = ¡¹ s: In this regime, the ¯rm exhausts the
share repurchase opportunity so that the constraint (9) binds. In addition, the ¯rm also
distributes dividends. This ¯rm is mature, less productive, and has a large capital stock.
7The presence of equity issuance costs (¸ > 0) generates a kink in equity value. As a result,
there is a nontrivial region of states in which the ¯rm does not buy back or issue equity (st = 0).
Only when the ¯rm is su±ciently productive will it pay the issuance costs to raise new equity
to ¯nance investment. Note that the case with dt > 0 and st > ¡¹ s cannot happen at optimum.
If it happened, the ¯rm could reduce its tax burden by reducing dividends and repurchasing
shares.
The e®ect of dividend taxation on a ¯rm's investment policy depends on the ¯nance regimes
in two adjacent periods. With ¯rm heterogeneity, in any period there is a cross section of ¯rms
that may lie in di®erent ¯nance regimes. Thus, dividend taxation has di®erent e®ects on ¯rms
in di®erent regimes. This heterogeneity is crucial for our analysis for two reasons. First, if all
¯rms are identical, then all these ¯rms will lie in only one of the above ¯ve ¯nance regimes.
But in the data, at any point in time some ¯rms issue equity and some ¯rms pay out dividends
so that there are some ¯rms in each regime (see Auerbach and Hassett (2002) and Gourio and
Miao (2010)). Second, Gourio and Miao (2010) show that a permanent dividend tax cut does
not a®ect long-run capital stock in a model without ¯rm heterogeneity, while it raises long-run
capital stock when there is ¯rm heterogeneity.
2.2 Household
The representative household derives utility from consumption and leisure according to the




where ¯ is the discount factor, Ct denotes consumption, Nt denotes labor supply, and U satis¯es
U1 > 0; U11 < 0, U2 < 0, U22 < 0; and the Inada conditions.
The household owns all ¯rms and trades ¯rms' shares. In addition, the household also trades
a risk-free bond in zero net supply. It pays dividend taxes, personal income taxes, and capital
gains taxes. In order to write its budget constraint, we must aggregate all ¯rms' quantities. To
this end, we let ¹t denote the cross sectional distribution of ¯rms over the state (k;z) in period
8t: The budget constraint is then given by:
Ct +
Z
















dt + Pt ¡ (1 + ¸1st>0)st ¡ ¿
g
t (Pt ¡ Pt¡1 ¡ (1 + ¸1st>0)st)
i
µtd¹t¡1;
where µt denotes the shares owned by the household, bt denotes bond holdings, rt denotes the
interest rate, and Tt denotes the transfer from the government. In equilibrium µt = 1 and
bt = 0 for all t:




































Note that in the absence of aggregate uncertainty, there is no risk premium and thus the
preceding equations imply that the required rate of return on equity is equal to the after tax
interest rate. As a result, we obtain equations (3) and (4).
2.3 Government
As a starting point, we consider a simple government budget rule in which tax revenues collected
by the government are rebated to the household in a lump-sum manner. In addition, we abstract
away from government spending. Because we allow for lump-sum transfers, there is no loss of
generality in assuming that the government budget is balanced in each period.
2.4 Equilibrium
Conditional on aggregate states, ¯rms can be di®erentiated by their capital stock and idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks. We use the cross sectional distribution of ¯rms ¹t to conduct
aggregation based on each ¯rm's behavior derived in Section 2.1. This distribution is over ¯rm-
speci¯c capital stock and idiosyncratic productivity shocks (k;z): Its law of motion satis¯es:
¹t+1 (A £ B) =
Z
1gt(k;z)2AQ(z;B)¹t (dk;dz); (13)
9where 1 is an indicator function, gt is the policy function for the capital stock such that kt+1 =
gt(kt;zt); and A and B are measurable sets. We can then de¯ne a competitive equilibrium in
the usual manner. In particular, each ¯rm optimizes, the household optimizes, and aggregate
markets clear.
















st (k;z)¹t (dk;dz) =
Z
yt (k;z)¹t (dk;dz);
where xt (k;z), st (k;z); and yt (k;z) are a ¯rm's optimal investment and equity issuance/repurchase
policies and output supply derived in Section 2.1, respectively.
3 Results
We solve our model numerically and conduct simulations. Brie°y speaking, we ¯rst solve the
initial steady state before the dividend tax reform and then solve the ¯nal steady state after
the dividend tax reform. We ¯nally use a shooting algorithm to solve the transition path
connecting the two steady states. We provide a detailed description of our numerical method
in the Appendix.
3.1 Parameter Values
We calibrate our model at the annual frequency and match model moments in the initial steady
state with those obtained from the COMPUSTAT database.8 The sample period ranges from
1988 to 2002, which corresponds to the period before the 2003 dividend tax cut. We set the tax
rates in the initial steady state to correspond to the US federal statutory rates in 2002 before
the tax reform.
We consider the utility function:




8Our calibration strategy follows from Gourio and Miao (2010) closely. We refer the reader to that paper for
more details.
10where h > 0 is the weight on leisure. This utility function has a unitary Frisch elasticity of
labor supply, which is reasonable for macro models as argued by Hall (2008). We choose the
discount factor ¯ such that the steady-state interest rate is equal to 0:04 using equation (12).
We choose the parameter h to match the equilibrium labor supply of 0:3; which is the average
fraction of time spent on market work.
We choose the Cobb-Douglas production function with decreasing returns to scale, F (k;l;z) =
zk®kl®l; where 0 < ®k;®l < 1 and ®k + ®l < 1: We assume that the productivity shock follows
the process:
lnzt = ½lnzt¡1 + "t; (15)
where "t is i.i.d. and normally distributed with mean zero and variance ¾2: We set ½ and ¾
to be the estimates in Gourio and Miao (2010). We choose the depreciation rate to match the
aggregate investment-capital ratio, which is equal to 0.095 according to the National Income
and Product Accounts.
We follow Gomes (2001) and set the equity issuance cost ¸ = 0:028: We choose the limit
on share repurchase ¹ s such that share repurchases account for 25 percent of earnings, which
is close to the estimate documented by Allen and Michaely (2003). Finally, we choose the
adjustment cost parameter Ã to match the cross sectional volatility (standard deviation) of the
investment rate in the data, which is 0:156. A model without adjustment costs would deliver
a very high value of the cross sectional volatility of the investment rate, which is inconsistent
with the data.
In summary, we list the baseline parameter values in Table 1. The main di®erence between
this calibration and that in Gourio and Miao (2010) is that here we introduce equity issuance
costs and share repurchases in the baseline model. We also re-calibrate the adjustment cost
parameter accordingly to match the volatility of the investment rate.
[Insert Table 1 Here.]
We assume that the economy prior to period 1 is in the initial steady state with parameter
values given in Table 1. We then study the economy's responses to dividend and capital gains
tax cuts. We use our model to provide a quantitative evaluation of the impact of the 2003
dividend and capital gains tax cuts. After these tax cuts, the dividend and capital gains tax
11rates are reduced from the levels given in Table 1 to the same 15 percent level. The 2003
dividend and capital gains tax cuts were generally viewed as temporary, though their duration
was uncertain. We study both cases of temporary and permanent tax cuts in order to highlight
the di®erence between these two cases. In addition, in all the policy experiments below, we
assume that tax cuts are unexpected, since this seems the relevant case, as discussed in the
introduction.9
3.2 Unexpected Permanent Dividend and Capital Gains Tax Cuts
We start with the case in which the dividend and capital gains tax cuts are permanent. These
tax cuts are unexpected in period 1 but are known to be permanent as soon as they occur. To
separate out the e®ects of changes in the dividend tax rate and changes in the capital gains
tax rate, we also study the case in which only the capital gains tax rate changes holding the
dividend tax rate ¯xed.
First, we conduct the policy experiment in which only the capital gains tax rate is reduced
from 0.2 to 0.15 permanently. The dashed lines in Figure 1 present the transitional dynamics of
capital, investment, output, consumption, labor, and total factor productivity (TFP).10 After
about 40 periods the economy converges to the new steady state. The steady-state aggregate
capital stock, output, consumption, labor and investment increase by about 3.2, 0.4, 0.2, 0.1,
and 3.2 percent, respectively. This result re°ects the fact that the capital gains tax cuts reduce
the user cost of capital and hence bene¯t the economy in the long run.
[Insert Figure 1 Here.]
In the short run, the aggregate capital stock is predetermined, but aggregate investment
jumps up. In addition, the pre-tax interest rate rises initially to induce the household to
consume less and save more for investment, as illustrated in Figure 2. Because of the presence
9We can easily extend our analysis to the case of expected tax changes.

















where Yt; Kt; and Lt are aggregate output, capital stock, and labor demand, respectively. We have used the
Cobb-Douglas production function to compute TFP. This measure corresponds to the aggregate TFP that a
macroeconomist would compute given measured output, capital and labor.
12of convex capital adjustment costs, capital rises monotonically and smoothly to the new steady
state, but investment rises on impact and then gradually falls to the new steady state level.
Consumption falls initially and then rises to the new steady state level. As a result, the
representative household increases labor supply initially and then reduces labor supply. Because
the aggregate labor demand does not change on impact (since the capital stock and productivity
are ¯xed), the equilibrium wage falls initially and then gradually rises to the new steady state
level, as illustrated in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 Here.]
As presented by the dashed lines in Figure 2, the reduction in the capital gains tax rate in-
duces ¯rms to reduce dividend payments and equity issuance, but to increase share repurchases.
This raises the rate of capital gains, measured by
R ¡









from the initial steady-state level of 0.5 percent immediately to about 8 percent and then
reduces to the new steady-state level of about 0.6 percent. In the initial steady state, aggregate
equity value is constant. The 0.5 percent rate of capital gains re°ects the fact that ¯rms
repurchase shares (st+1 < 0) on average. In the new steady state, although aggregate equity
value is still constant, ¯rms buy back more equity, leading to a small increase in the rate of
capital gains. The increase in the capital gains on impact of about 8 percent re°ects a jump in
the value of the stock market, as ¯rms' tax-adjusted discount rates Rt;t+j de¯ned in (6) fall.
Interestingly, Figure 1 shows that the steady-state TFP decreases by about 0.65 percent
after the capital gains tax cuts. The intuition can be gained from the evolution of the ¯nance
regimes presented in Panel A of Figure 3. We ¯nd that, after the capital gains tax cuts, more
¯rms move to the dividend constrained regime (dt = 0 and st = ¡¹ s) and less ¯rms stay in the
dividend-paying regime (dt > 0 and st = ¡¹ s), because the capital gains tax cuts encourage
¯rms to substitute dividends for equity buy-back. In addition, there are less ¯rms in the equity
issuance regime (st > 0 and dt = 0). Because more ¯rms are constrained, capital cannot be
reallocated to more productive ¯rms from less productive ¯rms, leading to a decrease in the
TFP.
13[Insert Figure 3 Here.]
Next, we conduct the experiment in which both the capital gains and dividend tax rates
are reduced to the 15 percent level permanently. The economy's responses are presented by
the solid lines in Figures 1 and 2. We ¯nd that the short-run increase in investment is smaller
because ¯rms use some resources to pay out more dividends. But the long-run e®ects on
real quantities are larger due to the additional reallocation e®ect of the dividend tax cuts.
In particular, the steady-state TFP rises by about 0.36 percent, in contrast to the case of
the capital gains tax cuts only. The intuition comes from the ¯rms' payout behavior and the
changes in the ¯nance regimes. When both the capital gains and dividend tax rates are reduced,
¯rms increase dividend payments and equity issuance, but reduce share repurchases. Aggregate
dividends and equity issuance rise by about 12.5 and 60 percent on impact, respectively. In
the new steady state, they rise by about 15 and 55 percent, respectively. In addition, less ¯rms
are in the dividend-constrained regime (dt = 0 and st = ¡¹ s) and more ¯rms are in the equity
issuance regime (st > 0 and dt = 0), as illustrated in Panel B of Figure 3. Thus, the dividend
tax cuts generate e±cient reallocation of capital from less productive (mature) ¯rms to more
productive (immature) ¯rms.11
As in our paper, Korinek and Stiglitz (2009) show that aggregate capital and output in-
crease monotonically to their new steady state levels following a permanent dividend tax cut
(see Figure 5 in their paper). However, unlike ours, their model does not incorporate capital
depreciation and adjustment costs. Thus, the capital stock is equal to investment in their
model. So they follow an identical transition path. In addition, they do not study the capital
reallocation e®ect as measured by the change in TFP. They also do not study the e®ect of a
capital gains tax cut.
Panel B of Figure 3 also shows that more ¯rms move to the dividend-paying regime (dt > 0
and st = ¡¹ s) in response to the permanent dividend and capital gains tax cuts. Thus, these
tax cuts generate not only an intensive margin e®ect by changing a ¯rm's dividend payments,
but also an extensive margin e®ect by changing the number dividend-paying ¯rms. This result
cannot be obtained from a representative ¯rm model. Chetty and Saez (2005) ¯nd empirical
11See Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Buera and Shin (2009) for related analysis where changes in reallo-
cation friction lead to increased aggregate productivity.
14evidence that the 2003 dividend and capital gains tax cuts had both intensive and extensive
margin e®ects.
Figure 2 also shows that, in response to the permanent dividends and capital gains tax cuts,
the rate of capital gains rises to about 12 percent on impact and then decreases to a number
close to zero in the new steady state. The intuition is as follows. The permanent dividend and
capital gains tax cuts raise equity value and hence capital gains on impact. These tax cuts also
raise equity issuance, instead of raising share repurchases as in the case of the capital gains
tax cuts only. The increased equity issuance dilutes equity and reduces capital gains. Our
numerical experiment shows that the former e®ect dominates the latter in the initial period.
The latter e®ect becomes large later on so that the rate of capital gains fall. In the new steady
state, the net of aggregate equity issuance and share repurchases are close to zero and aggregate
equity value is constant over time. As a result, the rate of capital gains is close to zero in the
new steady state.
3.3 Unexpected Temporary Dividend and Capital Gains Tax Cuts
We now turn to the case of temporary dividend and capital gains tax cuts. The 2003 dividend
and capital gains tax cuts were initially scheduled to expire in 2008, and were later extended
through 2010. A further extension is uncertain. Thus, this tax policy is likely to be temporary
and unexpected. Our simulations below show that a temporary dividend and capital gains tax
cut has a surprising e®ect on the economy in the short to medium run.12
To simulate the transitional dynamics of the 2003 temporary tax cuts, we assume the
economy in period 1 is in the initial steady state corresponding to the tax system before the
tax cuts. The tax cuts are unexpectedly made in period 1 and last for 8 years. After 8 years,
the dividend and capital gains tax rates revert back to their original levels. Consequently, the
¯nal steady state is identical to the initial steady state.
[Insert Figure 4 Here.]
The solid lines in Figure 4 present the transitional dynamics of capital, investment, output,
consumption, labor, and TFP. In sharp contrast to Figure 1 in the case of permanent tax
12Korinek and Stiglitz (2009) make a similar point theoretically in a more stylized setup.
15cuts, investment jumps down in period 1 in response to the temporary tax cuts rather than
jumping up. Investment continues to decrease until period 8 and falls by about 11 percent
relative to its steady-state level in period 8. It jumps up by about 3 percent in period 9 and
then gradually falls until it reaches its steady-state level. The intuition behind this result can
be gained from Figure 5. In response to the dividend and capital gains tax cuts in period 1,
¯rms pay more dividends, so they cut back investment. The initial rise in dividends is about
15 percent. Anticipating the dividend tax rate will revert back to its original higher level in
period 9, ¯rms respond by cutting back investment and paying out large dividends in period 8,
while they reduce dividend payments and raise investment in period 9. In particular, dividend
payments rise by about 25 percent in period 8 and decrease by about 10 percent in period 9. To
summarize, ¯rms conduct intertemporal tax arbitrage by taking advantage of the temporary
lower dividend taxes to pay out large dividends.
[Insert Figure 5 Here.]
The decrease in capital in the short to medium run re°ects a higher after-tax interest rate, as
illustrated in Figure 5. This higher interest rate leads to the rise of labor supply in the initial
period by the intertemporal substitution e®ect. Thus, output also rises on impact because
capital is predetermined. Because capital decreases until period 9, output also decreases until
period 8, but consumption increases until period 8 because of high interest rates. Consumption
may rise by slightly more than 1 percent. In period 9, consumption and dividends drop,
but investment and labor rise, because starting in period 9 the dividend tax rate rises to its
original level permanently. After period 9, all variables gradually revert back to their steady
state values. Interestingly, TFP rises from periods 2 to 9. The reason is that the cost wedge
between internal and external funds is temporarily reduced from periods 1-8, yielding a positive
reallocation e®ect. The increase in TFP also contributes to the initial increase in output.
To isolate the e®ect of the change in the dividend tax rate from that of the change in the
capital gains tax rate, we present the transitional dynamics of real quantities using the dashed
lines in Figure 4 when only the capital gains tax rate changes holding the dividend tax rate
¯xed, as in Section 3.2. In this case, capital, investment, output, consumption, labor, and TFP
follow almost opposite paths to those in the case of both dividend and capital gains tax cuts.
16Similarly to Section 3.2, the intuition comes from the ¯rms' payout behavior. As illustrated
in Figure 5, the two cases deliver opposite transitional paths for aggregate dividends, equity
issuance and share repurchases. Intuitively, the temporary decrease in the capital gains tax
rate induces ¯rms to make more investments in the short run. But the temporary decrease
in the dividend tax rate induces ¯rms to cut back investment in order to make large dividend
payments in the short run. This e®ect is large enough so that the net e®ect of the dividend
and capital gains tax cuts is to decrease investment in the short run.
Figure 5 also shows that the rate of capital gains rises from 0.5 percent to 9 percent in
period 1, but decreases to ¡2:1 percent in period 9, in response to the temporary dividend and
capital gains tax cuts. The initial rise in the rate of capital gains re°ects the fact that equity
value rises immediately. The fall of the rate of capital gains in period 9 re°ects the fact that
equity value drops in period 9 because starting from this period on dividends and capital gains
tax rates revert back to their original higher levels. By contrast, in response to the temporary
capital gains tax cuts only, the rate of capital gains rises by about 3 percent in period 9, rather
than falling. The intuition is that ¯rms reduce equity issuance and raise share repurchases in
period 9 because they expect the capital gains tax rate will revert back to the initial higher
level forever after period 9. The increase in share repurchases in period 9 raises capital gains.
[Insert Figure 6 Here.]
Figure 6 presents the transitional dynamics of the ¯nance regimes. In response to the
temporary capital gains tax cuts, the shares of ¯rms in the dividend-paying regime (dt > 0
and st = ¡¹ s) and the equity issuance regime (dt = 0 and st > 0) temporarily fall from periods
1-8, but the share of dividend-constrained ¯rms (dt = 0 and st = ¡¹ s) temporarily rise. They
follow an opposite pattern when both dividend and capital gains taxes are cut temporarily. As
in Section 3.2, the evolution of the ¯nance regimes illustrates the e±cient reallocation e®ect of
the dividend tax cuts and the ine±cient reallocation e®ect of the capital gains tax cuts.
As in our paper, Korinek and Stiglitz (2009) also ¯nd that ¯rms cut back investment
and pay large special dividends in the period immediately prior to the expiration date of the
dividend tax cut (see their Figure 6). But unlike our paper, they do not predict that investment
rises in the period when the dividend tax cut expires. They also do not predict that output,
17consumption, and TFP may rise temporarily in the transition phase.
[Insert Figure 7 Here.]
To compare our model's predictions with the actual data, we plot the ratio of the total
dividend to total capital, the ratio of total equity issuance to total capital, and the aggregate
investment rate in Figure 7. The circled lines present the actual data from the COMPUSTAT
over 2002-2008. We assume that the economy in 2002 was in a steady state before the tax
cuts. We normalize the actual data and simulated data by their values in 2002. From Figure
7, we observe that both cases with the temporary and permanent tax cuts capture the fact
that aggregate dividends and aggregate equity issuance rose in 2003 in the data. We also
observe that, in the data, the aggregate investment rate decreased in 2003. The case with the
temporary tax cuts rather than the permanent tax cuts seems to be consistent with this fact.
However, we should emphasize that the investment rate and equity issuance are very volatile in
the data partly due to business cycles. Our model abstracts from aggregate uncertainty. This
makes it di±cult to evaluate the ¯t of the model during the reform.
4 Extension: Debt Financing
We now extend the baseline model to incorporate debt ¯nancing. To keep the model tractable,
we consider risk-free debt and ignore the issue of default. Debt has a tax advantage in that
interest payments are tax deductible. But debt is limited by a collateral constraint, as in
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Hennessy and Whited (2005). Suppose a ¯rm may issue debt
bt with interest rate rt. We interpret the case with bt < 0 as saving. The collateral constraint
is given by:
(1 + rt)bt · ´kt; b0 given, (16)





+ dt + (1 + rt)bt = (1 ¡ ¿c)¼ (kt;zt;wt) + ¿c (±kt + rtbt) + st + bt+1: (17)
Its decision problem is to choose fbt+1;kt+1;st;dt;xtg so as to maximizes (5) subject to (17),
(8), (9), and (16). In this case, there are three state variables (kt;bt;zt) in the ¯rm's dynamic
18programming problem. As a result, ¯rms can be di®erentiated by these three characteristics.
In the cross section, there is a distribution ¹t of ¯rms over (kt;bt;zt): We use this distribution
to conduct aggregation. We can then de¯ne a competitive equilibrium as in Section 2.4.
We set ´ = 0:3; which is within the range of estimates of capital resale discounts in Ramey
and Shapiro (2001). Our results are robust to changes in this parameter value. In addition,
this value implies that the ratio of debt to ¯rm value is 0.14, which is within the estimates in
the literature. We take all other parameter values as in Table 1. Based on these parameter
values, we solve the model numerically and compare the solution with that in the baseline
model. We present our numerical method and detailed results in a separate appendix available
upon request. Here we just summarize our main ¯ndings.
First, the °exibility of using debt and equity ¯nancing allows ¯rms to reduce the cost of
capital and thus bene¯ts the economy. In particular, the steady-state aggregate real quantities
such as investment, capital stock, consumption, employment, and output are all higher in
the extended model than in the baseline model. In addition, the impacts of the tax cuts on
the economy in the two models are qualitatively similar, though there are some quantitative
di®erences. For instance, the capital stock increases by 3.12 percent following the reform,
whereas it is 4.05 percent in the baseline model without debt.
Second, the transitional dynamics of real quantities in the baseline model and in the ex-
tended model are similar. The main di®erence between the two models' predictions is re°ected
in the ¯nancial quantities. In the extended model with debt, ¯rms can borrow or save to
transfer cash from the future to the present or from the present to the future. This additional
°exibility allows ¯rms to conduct intertemporal tax arbitrage so that they can take greater ad-
vantage of low dividend taxes. In the baseline model without debt, in order to take advantage
of low dividend taxes, the only way to pay more dividends for ¯rms is to cut back investment,
ceteris paribus.
We ¯nd that in response to the unexpected and permanent tax cuts, aggregate debt rises
over time. This is because the collateral constraints are gradually relaxed as ¯rms build up
capital stock over time. Because ¯rms can borrow against their future earnings, they can
distribute more dividends initially to take advantage of the dividend tax cut immediately.
When the dividend and capital gains tax cuts are unexpected and temporary, ¯rms raise
19more debt to distribute more dividends when dividend taxes are low. As in the baseline model
without debt, ¯rms also cut back investment to pay more dividends. Overall, the transitional
dynamics of real quantities are very similar in the models with and without debt, but dividends
and equity issuance are more volatile in the extended model with debt.
5 Conclusion
We have developed a dynamic general equilibrium model to study the impact of the 2003 div-
idend and capital gains tax cuts. In the model, ¯rms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity
shocks. They choose investment and ¯nancial policies subject to capital adjustment costs, eq-
uity issuance costs, and collateral constraints. We ¯nd that, when the dividend and capital
gains tax cuts are unexpected and permanent, the aggregate real quantities such as output,
consumption, labor, investment, and capital all increase in the steady state. During the transi-
tion path, aggregate capital rises monotonically over time and investment rises in the short to
medium run. By contrast, when these tax cuts are unexpected and temporary, the steady state
does not change. Aggregate investment decreases and dividend payments increase during the
periods when the tax cuts are implemented. In addition, aggregate output rises temporarily in
the short run due to the increase in labor and the positive capital reallocation e®ect, measured
by the temporary increase in TFP. When the tax cuts expire, investment surges and dividend
payments fall. We ¯nd that these results are robust to the introduction of debt ¯nancing.
Without debt ¯nancing, in order to take advantage of low dividend taxes, the only way for
¯rms to pay more dividends is to cut back investment, ceteris paribus. With debt ¯nancing,
¯rms can conduct intertemporal tax arbitrage by borrowing or saving to transfer cash across
time. We also show that having the opportunity to choose between equity and debt ¯nancing
reduces the cost of capital. Consequently, the steady-state aggregate real quantities are higher
than those in an otherwise identical model without debt.
20Appendix: Numerical Method
We present the numerical method used to solve the model without debt. In a separate
appendix, we present the numerical method and results for the extended model with debt.
The algorithm consists of two parts. First, we compute the steady-state for given tax rates
¡
¿c;¿d;¿g;¿i¢
. Second, we compute the transition path from the initial steady-state prior to
the tax changes to the new steady-state after the tax changes.
A Steady State
To solve for a steady-state, we proceed in three steps. First, for a given wage, we compute a
single ¯rm's optimal decision rules. Next, we compute the stationary distribution. Finally, we
check whether the labor market equilibrium condition holds; if not, we adjust the wage and go
back to the ¯rst step. We now provide more details about each step.
Step 1. Starting with a guess of wage w, solve the ¯rm's dynamic programming problem
by value function iteration on a grid. We use a grid with 600 points for the capital stock and 10
points for productivity shocks. The grid for the capital stock is ¯ner for low values of capital.
The lower bound for capital is 0:001 and the upper bound is chosen so that it binds with very
small probabilities in a stationary equilibrium. The grid for productivity shocks is taken from
Joao Gomes' program, which implements the usual Tauchen and Hussey (1991) approximation
for an AR(1) process.
Step 2. After obtaining decision rules from step 1, we solve for the stationary distribution
of ¯rms ¹¤(k;z;w): To do so, we simply iterate on equation (13), de¯ned in the main text,
starting from a uniform distribution over (k;z):
Step 3. After obtaining the stationary distribution of ¯rms, we derive the aggregate labor
demand Ld(w) =
P
k;z ¹¤(k;z;w)l(k;z;w): We then check whether the labor market clears,
i.e. whether the equation ¡U2(C;Ld (w))=U1(C;Ld (w)) = (1 ¡ ¿i)w holds, where aggregate
consumption C is deduced from the resource constraint and the stationary distribution. If the
equilibrium condition is not satis¯ed, we use the bisection method to update the wage rate and
go back to Step 1.
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: Denote the initial steady-state quantities with
a bar, e.g. C;K; etc., and the associated cross-sectional distribution by ¹(k;z): Denote the
new steady-state with a star, e.g. C¤;K¤; and the associated cross-sectional distribution by
¹¤(k;z):
Step 2. Guess a path for the interest rate frt+1g
T
t=1 and a path for the wage rate fwtg
T
t=1.
Step 3. Given fwt;rtg, solve the ¯rm's dynamic programing problem by ¯nite backward
induction, assuming that VT(k;z) is the new steady-state value function V ¤(k;z): Deduce the
policy function kt+1 = gt(k;z):
Step 4. Given the policy functions calculated in step 3, compute the cross-sectional dis-
tribution for any time t, using equation (13). For t = 0; ¹t = ¹: Then, obtain ¹t for any
t = 1;2;:::;T: Deduce the aggregates Yt;Nt;Ct, for t = 1;:::;T ¡ 1; using aggregation and the
resource constraints.
Step 5. Check if the interest rate and wage are consistent with market clearing. More
precisely, de¯ne





b rt+1 = U1(Ct;Nt)=(¯U1(Ct+1;Nt+1))=(1 ¡ ¿i) ¡ 1;
where CT = CT+1 = C¤: If maxt=1;:::;T jb wt ¡ wtj+jb rt+1 ¡ rt+1j is less than a precision threshold,
stop. Otherwise, update both paths frt;wtg as follows and return to Step 3:
wnew
t = (1 ¡ ½)wt + ½b wt;
rnew
t+1 = (1 ¡ ½)rt+1 + ½b rt+1:
In practice, we set ½ = 0:9:
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24Table 1. Baseline Parameter Values
Parameter Value
Corporate income tax ¿c 0.340
Personal income tax ¿i 0.250
Dividend tax ¿d 0.250
Capital gain tax ¿g 0.200
Exponent on capital ®k 0.311
Exponent on labor ®l 0.650
Shock persistence ½ 0.767
Shock standard deviation ¾ 0.211
Depreciation rate ± 0.095
Discount factor ¯ 0.971
Weight on leisure h 6.616
Adjustment cost Ã 0.890
Equity issuance cost ¸ 0.028












































Figure 1: Impact of unexpected permanent tax cuts in the baseline model. The
economy before period 1 is at the initial steady state with parameter values given in Table
1. The solid lines plot the responses of capital (K), output (Y ), consumption (C), labor (N),
investment (I), and TFP to the unexpected permanent cuts of the dividend tax rate from 0.25
to 0.15 and of the capital gains tax rate from 0.20 to 0.15. The dashed lines plot the case
when only the capital gains tax rate is reduced from 0.20 to 0.15. In each panel, the horizontal
axis measures time period, and the vertical axis measures percentage deviation from the initial












































Figure 2: Impact of unexpected permanent tax cuts in the baseline model. The
economy before period 1 is at the initial steady state with parameter values given in Table
1. The solid lines plot the responses of aggregate dividend payments, equity issuance, share
repurchases, the rate of capital gains, wage and the pre-tax interest rate to the unexpected
permanent cuts of the dividend tax rate from 0.25 to 0.15 and of the capital gains tax rate
from 0.20 to 0.15. The dashed lines plot the case when only capital gains tax rate is reduced. In
each panel, the horizontal axis measures the time period. In the top three panels, the vertical
axes measure the percentage deviation from the initial steady state before the tax cuts. In the
bottom three panels, the vertical axes measure the actual simulated values after the tax cuts.








Panel A:  Finance Regimes (Capital Gains Tax Cuts Only)







Panel B: Finance Regimes (Dividend and Capital Gains Tax Cuts) 
 
 
dt > 0,st = −¯ s
dt = 0,st = −¯ s
dt = 0,−¯ s < st < 0
dt = 0,st = 0
dt = 0,st > 0
Figure 3: Impact of unexpected permanent tax cuts in the baseline model. The
economy before period 1 is at the initial steady state with parameter values given in Table 1.
Panel A plots the evolution of the ¯nance regimes in response to the unexpected permanent
cuts of the dividend tax rate from 0.25 to 0.15 and of the capital gains tax rate from 0.20 to
0.15. Panel B plots the case when only the capital gains tax rate is reduced. The vertical axes















































Figure 4: Impact of unexpected temporary tax cuts in the baseline model. The
economy before period 1 is at the initial steady state with parameter values given in Table
1. The solid lines plot the responses of capital (K), output (Y ), consumption (C), labor (N),
investment (I), and TFP to the unexpected temporary cuts of the dividend tax rate from 0.25
to 0.15 and of the capital gains tax rate from 0.20 to 0.15. The tax cuts last from periods 1 to
8. The dashed lines plot the case when only the capital gains tax rate is reduced. In each panel,
the horizontal axis measures time period, and the vertical axis measures percentage deviation
















































Figure 5: Impact of unexpected temporary tax cuts in the baseline model. The
economy before period 1 is at the initial steady state with parameter values given in Table
1. The solid lines plot the responses of aggregate dividend payments, equity issuance, share
repurchases, the rate of capital gains, wage and the pre-tax interest rate to the unexpected
temporary cuts of the dividend tax rate from 0.25 to 0.15 and of the capital gains tax rate
from 0.20 to 0.15. The tax cuts last from periods 1 to 8. The dashed lines plot the case when
only capital gains tax rate is reduced. In each panel, the horizontal axis measures the time
period. In the top three panels, the vertical axes measure the percentage deviation from the
initial steady state before the tax cuts. In the bottom three panels, the vertical axes measure
the actual simulated values after the tax cuts.
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Panel B: Finance Regimes (Dividend and Capital Gains Tax Cuts) 
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Figure 6: Impact of unexpected temporary tax cuts in the baseline model. The
economy before period 1 is at the initial steady state with parameter values given in Table 1.
Panel A plots the evolution of the ¯nance regimes in response to the unexpected temporary
cuts of the dividend tax rate from 0.25 to 0.15 and of the capital gains tax rate from 0.20 to
0.15. The tax cuts last from periods 1 to 8. Panel B plots the case when only the capital gains





























Figure 7: Comparison of the simulated results and the actual data. The circled lines
present the actual data from the COMPUSTAT over 2002-2008. The solid (dashed) lines
present the model simulated data assuming that the economy in 2002 was in a steady state
and that the dividend and capital gains tax cuts are permanent (temporary). We normalize
the actual data and simulated data by their values in 2002.
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